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(e.) The Senior Naval Officer should be authorised before any attack on the Dane Island and Bogue Forts is made and at such moment, as he may deem appropriate, to reconnoitre and photograph them from the air.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W'. 1,
April 19, 1927.
(State.)
(Signed)
APPENDIX I.
BEATTY.
G. F. MILNE.
H. TRENCHARD.
From Commander-in-Chief, China, to Admiralty.
Cypher G.E. (C. in C.).
1921.
April 14, 1927. 977. Your 720.* I attended meeting to-day, Thursday, the 14th April, at which American, Japanese, French and Italian S.N.O.'s stated that, although first two had sent recommendations, they had not yet been asked for their views regarding concerted action if required to enforce compliance with ultimatum, and that they could not take part in any operation without approval of their respective Govern- ments. An informal discussion based on assumption that we had all been asked by our Governments for our views on concerted action revealed-
(a.) French Admiral is reluctant to, and thinks that his Government will not
consent to any stronger measures than pacific blockade of Yangtse. (.) British. American. Japanese and Italian S.N.O.'s informally agree to
recommend
(i.) Destruction of Wusung Forts. (ii) Destruction of Yangtse Forts.
(iii) Bombardment of Hankow Arsenal.
British, Japanese and Italian recommend such action to be carried out simul- taneously, others in sequence. No offensive action to be taken against any position actually held by Northerners, whose continued advance is problematical In case of isolated action by British being approved by His Majesty's Government, I recom- mend that operations as detailed in (a) and (b) of my 971,* leaving out places occupied by Northerners. American Admiral would not press suggestion re Customs Surtax being seized.
All S.N.O.'s were against sinking or seizing Chinese warships unless they interfered.
APPENDIX II.
Decypher of Telegram from Sir M. Lampson (Peking), No. 714, dated April 15, 1927.
I EXPLAINED position as set forth in your telegram No. 278* to the four Ministers on the 14th April.
They all took note of views of His Majesty's Government for the information of their Governments.
After deciding to-day, the 15th April, on terms of our joint recommendations on Chen's note of the 14th April (see my telegram No. 712*), discussion reverted to question of sanctions. American Minister and Japanese Minister took full part whilst making it clear that they were not authorised to agree to anything. Undoubtedly, sense of meeting was (see your telegram No. 288,* since received) that first and most obvious thing to do was to destroy Hankow and Canton arsenals,
Not printed.
which might conceivably be quite sufficient alone to achieve our purpose. If that failed, Wu [ Sung] for and possibly cutting off supplies and men for South from crossing Yangtse ought to prove effective.
I do not wish to give away my Japanese or United States colleagues with their own Governments, but I was frankly surprised at whole-hearted manner in which they endorsed these suggestions. It was finally decided that I should recommend these specific sanctions to His Majesty's Government and suggest to them desirability of getting other Governments to agree.
Should His Majesty's Government decide to do so, I am particularly anxious that nothing should be said at any capital which might give my colleagues away to their Governments. Further, I have their complete confidence, but Japanese Minister had a bad jolt yesterday when he had a telegram from Tokyo reporting an interview there on the 11th April with His Majesty's Ambassador, when he, Japanese Minister, was apparently quoted on a report of mine as himself strongly opposing principle of sanctions. I have disposed of any little soreness, but it shows the need for great watchfulness.
(Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 714. Repeated to Shanghai, Commander-in- Chief, Hong Kong, and Tokyo.)
APPENDIX III.
Decypher Telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated April 14.
YOUR telegram of 12th April.* Danger we apprehend is that in revenge for proscribing Hong Kong general labour union, and as a result of Kinshan incident, extremists at Canton may-
(a) Endeavour to force another general strike in Hong Kong by means of intimidation. Forty men of the Dare to Die Corps are reported to have come here on 12th April and to be plotting bomb outrages. Police hope to capture them.
(b) Renewal of anti-British boycott by means of armed pickets at Canton and
elsewhere.
This would not be case "only of labour troubles in Hong Kong," but a direct communistic attack on a British Colony. Such attack would have to be met by individual action by Great Britain. I would add that approach of Labour Day, 1st May, must be taken into account in present situation.
We submit that this should not be tolerated, and that if an attack on this Colony in either form eventuates we should at once reply by occupying Bogue Fort and blockading the West River. Please also see Brenan's telegram to the Foreign Office, No. 23, of 11th April.*
You will observe from Barton's telegram* of 12th April to the Foreign Office that Chiang Kai Shek has suppressed by force general labour union at Shanghai. Never- theless I received to-day through Brenan protest from Canton authorities against action taken here, and Canton Press is full of violent propaganda on the subject.
Prompt action will be necessary when crisis comes, and I should be glad to have precise instructions beforehand as to steps which I may take in co-operation with local naval and military authorities.
(Repeated to Peking, No. 31, of the 14th April.)
* Not printed.
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